MODELING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOYALTY AND INSIDER THREAT by Kassa, Jacques Y.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2021-06
MODELING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
LOYALTY AND INSIDER THREAT
Kassa, Jacques Y.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67753
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








MODELING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
LOYALTY AND INSIDER THREAT 
by 
Jacques Y. Kassa 
June 2021 
Thesis Advisor: Hong Zhou 
Second Reader: Jonathan Roginski, 
 USMA (West Point) 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
MODELING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOYALTY AND INSIDER
THREAT
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Jacques Y. Kassa












11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Malicious insiders pose serious threats to public and private organizations by putting the nation’s homeland 
security at risk and causing millions of dollars in annual losses. Organizations have an urgent need to develop 
mitigating programs to deal with these threats. 
 In this research, we explore the possibility of using an individual’s loyalty as a mitigation factor. We employ 
two methods to determine the nature of the relationship between loyalty and insider threats and explore whether 
the impacts of their interactions can lead to the use of loyalty as a mitigating factor. First, we model the 
relationships with four linear regression models. We illustrate our approach running simulations with insider 
threat data from the Department of Defense Personnel and Security Research Center and loyalty data analytically 
generated using a weight and score method. Second, we exploit Kermack-McKendrick SIR differential equation 
models to investigate interactions between the two constructs. We consider the employed population as 
susceptible, insiders as an infected population, and loyalty as the control element. In the first SIR model, we 
run a simulation without mitigation and let the system self-regulate. In the second model, we run the simulation 
with loyalty as mitigation measures. 
 The results show a negative correlation and a dynamic interaction between insider threat and loyalty. Insider 
threat decreases as a result of the implementation of loyalty as a mitigation measure.
14. SUBJECT TERMS





















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
MODELING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOYALTY AND INSIDER 
THREAT 
Jacques Y. Kassa 
Captain, United States Army 
BS, University of Benin, 1992 
MS, University of Benin, 1997 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED MATHEMATICS 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2021 





Chair, Department of Applied Mathematics 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
Malicious insiders pose serious threats to public and private organizations by 
putting the nation’s homeland security at risk and causing millions of dollars in annual 
losses. Organizations have an urgent need to develop mitigating programs to deal with 
these threats. 
In this research, we explore the possibility of using an individual’s loyalty as a 
mitigation factor. We employ two methods to determine the nature of the relationship 
between loyalty and insider threats and explore whether the impacts of their interactions 
can lead to the use of loyalty as a mitigating factor. First, we model the relationships with 
four linear regression models. We illustrate our approach running simulations with 
insider threat data from the Department of Defense Personnel and Security Research 
Center and loyalty data analytically generated using a weight and score method. Second, 
we exploit Kermack-McKendrick SIR differential equation models to investigate 
interactions between the two constructs. We consider the employed population as 
susceptible, insiders as an infected population, and loyalty as the control element. In the 
first SIR model, we run a simulation without mitigation and let the system self-regulate. 
In the second model, we run the simulation with loyalty as mitigation measures. 
The results show a negative correlation and a dynamic interaction between insider 
threat and loyalty. Insider threat decreases as a result of the implementation of loyalty as 
a mitigation measure. 
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Malevolent insiders have come to be a major threat to society. They are blamed for millions
of dollars in annual losses, they put the lives of our service members in danger and they put
the our national security at risk. In [1], the Department of Homeland Security emphasized
the extent of the danger insider threats pose to organizations and the urgent pursuit to find
an effective solution:
Insider threats are the source of many losses in critical infrastructure industries.
Additionally, well-publicized insiders have caused irreparable harm to national
security interests. An insider threat is defined as the threat that an employee or
a contractor will use his or her authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to
do harm to the security of the United States. Although policy violations can
be the result of carelessness or accident, the primary focus of this project is
preventing deliberate and intended actions such as malicious exploitation, theft
or destruction of data or the compromise of networks, communications or other
information technology resources. [1]
The threats that have evolved into a global challenge are amplified by a technological
expansion, an antagonism, and a pursuit of superiority among organizations and nations.
The threatswill escalate as the expansion of information dissemination leads towider contact
and diffusion of classified data [1]. The amount of notorious and malign attacks against
the government and the high-level leaks prove the necessity for efficacious and efficient
mitigation programs to eradicate the threats. As the problem intensifies, the urgency to find
solutions leads to an emergence of prevention measures and therefore an increase of their
safety cost. The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security deploy
resources in the form of training, funding, and manpower to deter the risks associated with
the phenomenon. The military’s insider threat training programs, the extensive information
security programs, the vetting processes both in governmental and private organizations,
and the budget they require are just some examples. Records showing that private companies
spent on average approximately 11.5 million dollars in 2020 to combat insider threats [2],
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and the creation of National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) in 2011 are the latest
indications of how dire the situation really is [3].
For the most part, prevention methods are developed to address risks related to violators’
motives. Historical data suggests those motives differ from one perpetrator to another, and
their diversity carries the difficulty in finding an adequate solution to the problem [4]. [5]
indicates that some are motivated by financial gains; former Master Sergeant in the United
States Air Force collected classified information and offered to sell it to SaddamHussein for
13 million dollars. Other groups’ motivations are ideological or political. On November 5,
2009MAJ Hasan of the United States Army assassinated 13 personnel and injured 32 others
in protest the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq [5]. Days after the attack, news outlets disclosed
that the military had been cognizant of communications between Hasan and al-Qaeda [6].
This research is interested in a third group that pulls its inspiration from loyalty. the purpose
is to determine whether we can use loyalty to mitigate insider threats. These violators claim
loyalty to objects including but not limited to money, ideology, political view, religious
belief, organizations, countries, or a certain population. Daniel Ellsberg, the activist who
leaked a 7,000-page top-secret classified document known as the Pentagon Papers to New
York Times reporters whowould publish the first copies of a series on June 13, 1971, claimed
loyalty to the American people [7]. In an interview with a Times reporter in days leading to
his trial [8], Ellsberg quoted the first code of Ethics For Government Service as the basis
of his action: ”Place loyalty to the high moral principles and to country above loyalty to
persons, party, or Government department.” During his trial, he proclaimed:
I felt that as an American citizen, as a responsible citizen, I could no longer
cooperate in concealing this information from the American public. I did this
clearly at my own jeopardy and I am prepared to answer to all the consequences
of this decision. [9]
To ascertain whether loyalty can serve as a mitigation factor, it is important to investigate
the relationship between loyalty and insider threats by answering the questions: What role
does loyalty play in posing an insider threat? What is the impact of loyalty on insiders?
The answer to those two questions may garner the solutions to solving insider threats. This
thesis proposes two methods in answering those questions. First, we use four simple linear
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regression models to analyze the correlation between loyalty and insider threat. The second
method explores the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) differential equations model to
analyze the dynamic interaction between the two concepts.
The results will show that there is a high negative correlation between the two constructs, a
strong evidence that when an individual’s loyalty increases, the probability of posing insider
threats decreases. Loyalty can be an effective mitigating measure against insider threats.
3




While there has been many studies on insider threats and loyalty as separate components,
none had focused on the interrelationship between the two modules.
2.1 Insider Threats
Different definitions outline the multiple perspective of insider threats. While the private
sector and the government organizations come close to agreeing on the definition of an
insider described as ”a person with legitimate access to an organization’s information
systems, including employees, contractors, vendors and consultants” [10], [11], they have
different views on what constitutes an insider threat. Private organizations focus on the
information security aspect.
While Theoharidou et al. [12] define an insider threat as the abuse of trusts and the breach of
an organization’s information security program by those who are given access, Pfleeger et
al. in [13], describe the term as the acts of a trusted individual who put an institution at risk
in a disruptive manner. Those two definitions do not reflect the nature of the perpetrator’s
intention and whether the action is deliberate or accidental. In [14], Sarkar asserts that
insiders can act malevolently or accidentally while executing their tasks. This is a viewpoint
Carroll shares in [15]. Shultz [16] contradicts Sarkar by insisting that unintentional actions
should be disregarded.
In contrast, governmental organizations take a broader view by including terrorism and
danger to the national security of the United States in the official definition:
insider threat: the threat that an insider will use her/his authority access, wit-
tingly or unwittingly to do harm to the security of the United States. This
threat can include damage to the Unite States through espionage, terrorism,
unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or
degradation of department resources or capabilities. [10]
The one point of convergence between private and governmental organizations while defin-
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ing an insider threat is the consideration that the act can be either premeditated or accidental.
For the purpose of this research, we will adopt the government’s definition.
Previous researchers showed that the motives are the same across the board. Malicious
insiders have many motivations to include ideology, religious and political views, and
financial gain. Money is a major factor for many, and it can push employees of any level
or rank to become an insider [5]. Financially restrained employees can take advantage of
their position for monetary gain, especially if they feel that they are underpaid. Emotional
situations like disgruntlement, depression, hopelessness, anger and others can be solid
prerequisites [17], [18]. Political motivations such as ideology, vengeance, retribution,
espionage, and activism are more frequent in government organizations than in the civilian
sectors.
In [17], Adenike believes that accidental actions are the main causes of insider threats. They
can range from simple negligence of security measures, to distraction, to unintentional
exposure of classified information on personal devices or complacency, to mishandling of
sensitive informationwhile doing one’s job. The riskmay be higher now thatmost employees
work from home. While unintentional insiders are repeated perpetrators, because they are
not aware of the violations, the authors of [19] explain that the threat can be easily mitigated
with training and education.
We have not found any prior research proving that accidental insiders act out of disloyalty to
make ground for the introduction of loyalty training. A number of sources pointed out that
many organizations choose not to report incidents for fear of negative publicity, difficulty to
recognize the offenders, ignorance of the violations, failing to notice the violation because
of negligible consequences, coworkers being unable to identify the suspicious activities, or
witnesses purposely refusing to report by fear of retribution [11], [18].
Many articles ( [5], [18], [20]) posit that the consequences of insiders are very serious
for private organizations with millions of dollars in annual losses, and more so for the
government where the challenges extend far beyond monetary damages into risk to national
security and loss of life. Various documents show that the strategies adopted to combat
the phenomenon differ by type of organization and risk. While both sectors believe that
training can solve the problem, and invest heavily in it government agencies implicate many
other departments to track and punish violators in order to dissuade insiders. As a result,
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many threat detection and prevention techniques, strategies, policies, training, education
and frameworks are introduced [21].
However, none of these traditional mitigating techniques considers loyalty as a prevention
measure, capable of deterring potential offenders from their malicious behavior. To our
knowledge, there have not been any prior studies that explore loyalty as an alleviating
measure.
2.2 Loyalty
The exploration of many documents reveals the importance of loyalty in our society. Social
organizations such as individual, family and country demand some level of loyalty to
define the contours of their networks and the relationships within. Marketing companies
have convinced and helped businesses expand based on people’s loyalty to specific brands.
Although loyalty pervades all aspects of life, social science scholars cannot agree on a
definition of the construct, and the disagreement includes whether the concept is a behavior
or an attitude. As a behavior, loyalty can help understand and prevent circumstances that
trigger an insider’s action. As an attitude, understanding previous acts may lead to building
sound mitigation tools. While these understandings can lead to finding countermeasures,
we did not find any record of research that explores the notion as deterrence.
In his book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschman [22] first introduced the concept of loyalty
when discussing how employees respond to dysfunctional organizations such as organi-
zational failures and lapses. However, he has been criticized for his lack of development
of the theory [23], [24]. In [25], Leck and Saunders estimated that for over two decades
Hirschman’s book has created confusion and dissatisfaction among scholars. They claim
that some have interpreted his concept of loyalty as an perspective that discourages quitting
(leaving an organization) and encourages a voice (speaking up) [26], and others as a be-
havior, such as exit and voice [27], [28]. Leck and Saunders will determine that those two
positions are crucial and together help explain how group members react when they are not
satisfied with the status their institutions [25].
This disagreement around the definition leads to even more confusion as the interpretations
lead to contradictory behaviors. While Rusbult claims in [27] that loyalty is remaining
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silent, Liden and Graen [29] think it is speaking up, and Vugt and Hart [28] argue that it is
staying in the group even when members can obtain better outcomes elsewhere. Today, we
can add a third option; punish the organization throughmalicious actions. Ellsberg punished
the Nixon administration to show loyalty to the American people when he published the
Pentagon Papers [8].
Unlike social science scholars, philosophy scholars converge to a common definition of the
construct. The firstWestern philosophy scholar to show interest in the concept, Joyce in [30],
proposed a definition widely accepted by his peers. After some independent philosophical
discussions of Roy’s definition, emerged a operational definition that characterizes loyalty
as:
a practical disposition to persist in an intrinsically valued associational attach-
ment, where that involves a potentially costly commitment to secure or at least 
not to jeopardize the interests or well-being of the object of loyalty. [31]
This definition shows why Ellsberg chose to protect his object of loyalty, and the American
people, and his willingness to pay the price rather than covering the government lies.
Nevertheless, philosophy also struggles to define the nature of loyalty. Some assert that it
is just a feeling [32]. Now, if loyalty is just a sentiment, it will be challenging to use it as
alleviation due to the difficulty to predict one’s feelings. Some argue that it is conduct, a
practical disposition [31]. As stated previously, understanding these conducts can lead to
the development of counter measures.
In [33], Mark Twain and Graham Greene claim that loyalty is a virtue although there is a
larger consensus that disloyalty is a villainy. As a virtue, both the subject and object of loyalty
should accept constructive criticism. A loyal opponent is necessary for corrective actions
within limits that guarantee the safety or benefice or the object of loyalty to blossom. This
oppositionwill not lead to rebellion. This will be the first timewe encounter an interpretation
that seems to justify whistle-blowers’ actions. On the other hand, there is another school
of thought that disagree that loyalty could be a virtue. For example, Ewin in [32] argues
that virtues are internally associated with good decision. Since the object of loyalty can be
mistaken and once chosen it is virtually impossible to rescind that decision, it is difficult
to accept loyalty as a virtue. This characterization depends on where one stands in relation
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to the object of loyalty. A perpetrator may assert that good judgement led him to pose his
malevolent actions. on the other hand, for the victim, it is a proof of loyalty badly placed
because of the consequences.
Additionally, one should be careful to attribute a single behavioral disposition to loyalty.
Although certain behaviors illustrate signs of loyalty as strong sentiment such as one
defending his object despite knowing their wrongdoing, or staying with a party despite its
flaws instead of leaving, other reasons that may not be linked to loyalty can influence those
decisions.
The area of loyalty that has seen ample research is customer loyalty in marketing literature.
In [34], Dick and Basu’s definition of customer loyalty incorporates most of the attributes
associated with the construct in both social sciences and philosophy:
Customer loyalty is viewed as the strength of the relationship between an
individual’s relative attitude and repeat patronage. The relationship is seen
as mediated by social norms and situational factors. Cognitive, affective, and
conative antecedents of relative attitude are identified as contributing to loyalty,
along with motivational, perceptual, and behavioral consequences.
Oliver [35] further establishes a link between consumer loyalty and satisfaction by demon-
strating that loyal consumers are those who are satisfied with their object, however, that
satisfaction does not always translate into loyalty. Satisfaction is necessary to form loyalty
but becomes insignificant when other elements such as fortitude and social attachment are
involved. Although Oliver was able to establish a relationship between loyalty and satis-
faction, we have not found any study that connects dissatisfaction and disloyalty that will
ultimately imply an association between disloyalty and insider threats. Consequently, this
study also did not prove a correlation between loyalty and insider threats.
While many studies have been done on insider threats and loyalty, none of them has linked
the two constructs in a single research. Even though many researchers have studied different
ways to detect indicators of insider threats and provided mitigating measures to deal with
the challenge, to our knowledge, none of them invoked loyalty as a prevention measure.
Nevertheless, loyalty remains a critical attribute of patriotism and potentially a valuable
deterrent in the fight against insider threat.
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3.1 Linear Regression Models
3.1.1 Data Collection
The data we use comes from different sources. While the insider threat data was made
available by the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) sis in
Monterey, California, we were not able to find data on loyalty. We generated the loyalty data
analytically using key elements from Royce’s definition: ”The willingness and practical and
thorough going devotion of a person to a cause.” [36]
Insider Threat
We received insider threat data from PERSEREC. The center collected information on
prior violators under the term espionage for research. They analyzed the data considering the
motives of the violators as categories and the behaviors displayed as indicators. They defined
two sets of categories. Major categories are motives with high percentage of perpetrators.
They include money, 48%; ideology, 30%; and divided loyalty, 10%. The minor categories
are motives with less than 2% of perpetrators for a total 12%. For the purpose of this project,
we will only consider the major categories. Along with the categories, the center identified
13 behavioral indicators and plotted a bar graph from which we deducted the insider threat
data entries [4].
Loyalty
As noted above, there is no loyalty data suitable for our research. We generate our data
analytically considering key terms from the definitions of loyalty. After analysing the def-
initions, we identified four categories: Commitment, to which we add the three already
used in insider threat and assign weights to each with respect to their importance on insider
threat and loyalty. The final categories and their weights are commitment, 35%; money,
20%; ideology, 30%; and divided loyalty, 15%. Additionally, we identify three behavioral
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indicators. From the 13 indicators analysed in insider threat, we select 10 that are relevant
to loyalty and add them to the three identified for a total of 13 behavioral indicators for this
project. Finally, we assign scores to each indicator based on how the categories influence
them and use weighted arithmetic mean (WAM), weighted geometric mean (WGM) and
weighted logarithmic mean (WLM) to produce the data entries for loyalty.
3.1.2 The Different Means
The weight and score system led us to compute an average for each attribute. We consider
WAM,WGM andWLM.We show the difference between the three means, prove thatWGM
is less thanWAM andWAM less thanWLM.We generate three different data tables that we
use in our analysis. To deal with potential bias in our data, we calculate uncertainty using
the WAM data and produce another table that we use in a fourth linear regression model
simulations.
Definitions
∀08, 18 ∈ R,
• Weighted Arithmetic Mean: ∑(0818)∑
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We consider a 3-term Taylor series expansion:
5 (G) = 5 (G0) + 5 ′(G0) (G − G0) +
1
2
5 ′′(G0) (G − G0)2 (3.2)
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We use allegiance as an example to show how we compute the data entries of each mean.
• Weighted Arithmetic Mean Data Computation and Table





To show how we compute the data entries we use the example of Allegiance. We
assume that an individual who pledges allegiance as a sign of patriotism to his
country, shows a high level of commitment to the cause of the country. He is less
likely to be persuaded into betraying his country by any means and is less likely to
sell his country for financial gain. He adheres to the ideology of the nation and what it
stands for, and will probably not accept another ideology. We assign to Allegiance a
score of 90 under the category Commitment, under the category of Money,50, under
the category of Ideology, 80, and under the category of Divided Loyalty, 20. We show
the computation below.
Commitment(.35) Money (.20) Ideology(.30) Divided Loyalty(.15)
Scores: 90 50 80 20
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Wemultiply the weights of the categories in percentage by the scores of the indicators
under each category. The sum of the products gives the data entry of each indicator.
," = 0.35 ∗ 90 + 0.20 ∗ 20 + 0.30 ∗ 80 + 0.15 ∗ 20 = 62.5
The results are summarized in the table below.
Table 3.1. Weighted Arithmetic Mean
• Weighted Geometric Mean Data Computation and Table
We generate the data set of the WGM model using the WGM formula. We use








Commitment(.35) Money (.20) Ideology(.30) Divided Loyalty(.15)
Scores: 90 50 80 20
We compute the natural logarithm of the scores of each indicator, multiply the result
by the weights of the categories in percentage, and calculate the exponent of the sum
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of the products to obtain the data entry of each indicator.
WGM = 4G?(0.35;=90 + 0.20;=20 + 0.30;=80 + 0.15;=20) = 51.32
The results are summarized in the table below.
Table 3.2. WGM Table
• Weighted Logarithmic Mean Data Computation and Table
We use the WLM formula to generate the WLM model data. We use allegiance as








Commitment(.35) Money (.20) Ideology(.30) Divided Loyalty(.15)
Scores: 90 50 80 20
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First, we calculate the exponent of each score. Next, we multiply the results by
weights in percentage. Then, we add up all the results. Finally, we calculate the
natural logarithm of the sum.
!> − "40= = ;=(0.354G?90 + 0.204G?20 + 0.304G?80 + 0.154G?20) = 88.95
The results are summarized in the table below.
Table 3.3. Logarithmic Mean Table
• Unbiased Data Computation and Table
To alleviate potential bias in the original data, we assume a Poisson distribution and
use the following steps with the WAM data.
– First, we calculate the square root of each data entry N.
17
– Next, we calculate the interval of the uncertainty  of each indicator.














The results are summarized in the table below.
Table 3.4. Unbiased Data Table
3.2 Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) Models
In this section, we will use MATLAB to analyze the differential equations models. We
consider Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) differential equations models to explore the
interaction between insider threat and loyalty. For the purpose of this research, we define
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some terms and make some assumptions:
• Terminology:
– The population is the workforce
– The Susceptible population is the non-insider employees.
– The infected population is the insiders.
– The recovered population is those who where infected but have recovered as
a result of the implementation of loyalty as prevention and mitigation factor
through training, display of loyalty behavior in the workplace and other means
of intervention.
– Birth is those who are entering the workforce.
– Death those exiting the workforce by termination, retirement, firing, resignation,
death . . .
• Assumptions:
– The population considered consists of the workforce and is fixed.
– A person can leave the susceptible if infected.
– A person can leave the infected group if they recover from the infection
– Recovered person receives immunity.
– Age, sex, social status, and race do not affect the probability of being infected.
– There is no inherited immunity.
– The members of each compartment mix homogeneously(have the same interac-
tions with one another to the same degree).
– Theworkforce entry and exit rates are included and are equal, as a result, changes
in population are negligible.
– All entries are into the susceptible population.
– The exit rate is equal for members of each compartment.
• Notation:
– S(t) is the susceptible population at time t.
– I(t) is the infected population at time t.
– R(t) is the recovered population at time t.
– N is the population size [37].
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3.2.1 Model 1: SIR Without Loyalty Mitigation
We assume that those who are susceptible can be infected, those who are infected can
recover.
Hence, the number of susceptible decreases, the number of recovered increases, and the
















= W (C) − U'(C). (3.10)
∀C ∈ [0,∞], ((C) +  (C) + '(C) = #. (3.11)








where V is the transmission rate, U the entry and exit rate, and W the recovery rate. We will
graph and analyze equations 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 using MATLAB.
3.2.2 Model 2: SIR with Loyalty as Prevention Measure
Many factors can influence one’s decision to become a malicious insider. This section will
measure the impact of loyalty on insider threat when used as a mitigating factor.
The average job growth and retirement rates in the United States are about 2.6% of the labor
force [39], [40]. the number of people entering employment and the population retiring
annually are equivalent. As a result, the employed population remains constant. Considering
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where ( is the susceptible population, , the infectious population, ', the number of people
who recovered from the infection, V, the rate of infection and W, the recovery rate. Let ? be
the rate of the employed population who complete a loyalty training or exposed to loyalty
as insider threat prevention measure.
The initial conditions become:
((0) = (1 − ?) (# − 1),
 (0) = 1,
'(0) = ?(# − 1).
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Now, we investigate the relationship between insider threat and loyalty with our proposed
methods. We explore respectively, the regression models using the programming language
R and the SIR differential equation models using MATLAB.
4.1.1 Regression Models
Weighted Arithmetic Mean
We plot the WAM data 3.1 and the least square estimate. The regression line prove to be too
rigid, not connecting the maximum of points in the graph. We graph a smooth spline, and
polynomial splines as shown in Figure 4.1. We obtain the following equations. The least
square estimate has a negative slope that indicating a negative correlation between insider
threat and loyalty.
• Models:
– Regression line equation
~ = −1.08G + 76.12
– Second degree polynomial equation
~ = 35.5G2 − 64.1G + 33.2
– Third degree polynomial equation




The graph below shows the WAM data, linear regression line in red, a smooth spline
in blue, a second degree polynomial smooth spline in brown and a third-degree
polynomial smooth spline in green.
Figure 4.1. WAM Model Regression Lines
• Residuals Analysis The residuals versus fitted plot shows on average a mean zero.
The QQ plot indicates that residuals follow a normal distribution. The leverage plot
show that the data is within 0.5 cook’s distance meaning that none of the indicators
is exerting too much leverage on the data. Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of the
least square estimate is machine zero:
– Least square estimate: 1.74−16
– 2nd Degree Polynomial: 1.374−17
– 3rd Degree Polynomial: 3.424−17
Our predictions are very close to the real data.
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Figure 4.2. WAM Residuals Analysis Graph
The results are summarized in table below.
LSE 2D Polynomial 3D Polynomial
Coef of Correlation −0.65
RSE 22.8 21.11 21.21
R-Squared 0.418 0.546 0.588
F-Stat 7.907 6.022 4.279
T-Value −2.812 1.68 −0.952
p-Value 0.016 0.019 0.039
Table 4.1. WAM Residuals Analysis Recapitulation Table
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Weighted Geometric Mean
We plot the WGM data 3.2 and the least square estimate. The regression line prove to be
very rigid, not connecting the maximum of points in the graph. We graph a smooth spline,
and polynomial splines as shown in Figure 4.3. We obtain the following equations. The least
square estimate has a negative slope that indicates a negative correlation −0.62 between
insider threat and loyalty.
• Models:
– Regression line equation
~ = −0.9747G + 66.96
– Second degree polynomial equation
~ = 22.96G2 − 61.32G + 33.2
– Third degree polynomial equation
~ = −10.2G3 + 22.96G2 − 61.32G + 33.2
Coefficient of Correlation
A = −0.62
The graph below shows of the geometric mean data, linear regression line in red,
a smooth spline in black, a second degree polynomial smooth spline in blue and a
third-degree polynomial smooth spline in green.
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Figure 4.3. WGM Model Regression Lines
• Residuals Analysis
The residuals versus fitted plot shows on average a mean zero. The QQ plot indicates
that residuals follow a normal distribution. The leverage plot show that the data is
within 0.5 cook’s distance meaning that none of the indicators is exerting too much
leverage on the data. The Root Mean Square Errors (RMSE) of the least square
estimate is machine zero:
– Ordinary Least Squared: 7.684 − 16
– 2nd Degree Polynomial: 2.734 − 16
– 3rd Degree Polynomial: 3.424 − 17
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Figure 4.4. WGM Residuals Analysis
The results are summarized in the table below.
LSE 2D Polynomial 3D Polynomial
Coef of Correlation −0.62
RSE 23.48 23.53 24.57
R-Squared 0.383 0.0.436 0.447
F-Stat 6.82 3.873 2.426
T-Value −2.612 0.976 −0.415
p-Value 0.024 0.056 0.133
Table 4.2. WGM Residuals Analysis Recapitulation Table
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Weighted Logarithmic Mean
We plot the WLM data 3.3 and the least square estimate. The regression line prove to be
very rigid, not connecting the maximum of points in the graph. We graph a smooth spline,
and polynomial splines as shown in Figure 4.5. We obtain the following equations. The least
square estimate has a negative slope that indicates a negative correlation −0.69 between
insider threat and loyalty. The WLM model produced the best results.
• Models:
– Regression line equation
~ = −1.18G + 108.73
– Second degree polynomial equation
~ = 19.11G2 − −68.41G + 33.2
– Third degree polynomial equation
~ = 7.69G3 + 19.11G2 − 68.41G + 33.2
– Coefficient of Correlation
A = −0.69
The graph below shows of the logarithmic mean data, linear regression line in red,
a smooth spline in black, a second degree polynomial smooth spline in blue and a
third-degree polynomial smooth spline in green.
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Figure 4.5. WLM Model Regression Lines
• Residuals Analysis The residuals versus fitted plot shows on average a mean zero.
The QQ plot indicates that residuals follow a normal distribution. The leverage plot
show that the data is within 0.5 cook’s distance meaning that none of the indicators
is exerting too much leverage on the data. The Root Mean Square Errors (RMSE) of
the least square estimate is machine zero:
– Ordinary Least Squared: 364 − 17
– 2nd Degree Polynomial: 1.964 − 16
– 3rd Degree Polynomial: 7.004 − 16
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Figure 4.6. WLM Residual Analysis
The results are summarized in the table below.
LSE 2D Polynomial 3D Polynomial
Coef of Correlation −0.69
RSE 21.62 21.86 22.90
R-Squared 0.467 0.0.514 0.519
F-Stat 10.10 5.279 3.245
T-Value −23.164 0.874 0.336
p-Value 0.009 0.027 0.07
Table 4.3. WLM Residuals Analysis Recapitulation Table
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Unbiased Model
The results of the unbiased data generated from the standard mean model are identical to
the ones of the original data, indicating that there were no biases in the data as we originally
assumed.
• Models:
– Regression line equation
~ = −1.08G + 75.40
– Second degree polynomial equation
~ = 35.5G2 − 64.1G + 33.2
– Third degree polynomial equation
~ = −20.2G3 + 35.5G2 − 64.1G + 33.2
Coefficient of Correlation
A = −0.65
The graph below shows of the unbiased WAM data, a linear regression line in red,
a second-degree polynomial smooth spline in green, and a third-degree polynomial
smooth spline in blue.
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Figure 4.7. Unbiased Model Regression Lines
• Residuals Analysis Root Mean Square Errors (RMSE) of the least squared estimate
is machine zero.
– Ordinary Least Squared: 1.74 − 16
– 2nd Degree Polynomial: 1.374 − 17
– 3rd Degree Polynomial: 3.424 − 17
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Figure 4.8. Unbiased Data Residuals Analysis
The results are summarized in the table below.
LSE 2D Polynomial 3D Polynomial
Coef of Correlation −0.65
RSE 22.8 21.11 21.21
R-Squared 0.418 0.546 0.588
F-Stat 7.907 6.022 4.279
T-Value −2.812 1.68 −0.952
p-Value 0.016 0.019 0.039
Table 4.4. Unbiased Data Recapitulation Table
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4.1.2 SIR Models
SIR Model Without Loyalty Mitigation
The graph below shows the changes in population of each compartment over time without
implementation of loyalty as a prevention measure.
We assume for initial condition that the susceptible population size ( = 155, 760, 000, the
infected population  = 1, the recovered population ' = 0, the infection rate V = 40%,
the employment entry and exit rate U = 2.6%, and the recovery rate W = 10%.We run the
simulation for a period of about three years.
Figure 4.9. Loyalty and Insider Threat Interactions Without Prevention Mea-
sures
SIR Models With Loyalty Mitigation
The following graphs show the impact of loyalty on insider threat at different levels of
mitigation measures completion rates. We assume for initial condition that the susceptible
population size is ( = (1 − ?)155, 760, 000, the infected population  = 1, the recovered
population ' = ? ∗ 155, 760, 000, the infection rate V = 40%, the recovery rate W = 10%.
We estimated different levels of mitigation completion rates ? ={20%, 40%, 50%, 60%,
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90%, 100%} and run the simulation for a period of about three years.
Figure 4.10. Progression at Different Levels of Mitigating Factor Completion
4.2 Analysis
4.2.1 Linear Regression Models
The linear regression line seems too rigid passing through the middle of the graph and
bypassing most points. Subsequently, we graph the smooth spline and the polynomials to
connect as many points as possible.
In our first observation, the results of the WAM and the unbiased data are identical. Our
original data is not as biased as we assumed. Considering the regression lines, we observe
that for each of the four types of data, the slope of the regression lines is negative, indi-
cating the existence of a relationship between the two variables and that the relationship
shows a decreasing trend. As loyalty increases, insider threat decreases. The coefficients
of correlation of all four linear regression models are negative, and the absolute value of
each coefficient greater than 0.6 shows a strong relationship between the two variables. The
root mean square errors (RMSE), the square root of the average of the squared differences
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between our prediction and the actual observation are all machine zero. This indicates
that the difference between the predicted values and the actual values is equal to zero, our
predictions are equivalent to the actual data. The p-value of least square estimates of each
model is ≤ 2.5%, our results are statistically acceptable.
4.2.2 SIR models
The SIR models show an interaction between Insider threat and loyalty. The model without
mitigation indicates that when we allow the system to take its course and self-correct over
a period of three years, the infected and the recovered populations increase within the first
year, reach a maximum around the same time, decrease, and stabilize towards the end the
first year and remain constant thereafter. The infected population stabilizes above zero. The
susceptible population decreases, reaches a minimum at the time the recovered population
reaches its maximum. Then, the susceptible population increases, and stabilizes but remains
greater than the recovered population. We observe an improvement with the SIR model
without mitigation. However, the issue of insider threat remains high. The self-correction
approach is ineffective against the threats.
The simulation with multiple levels of completion of the mitigating measures shows sig-
nificant improvement at each level. When 20% of the labor population complete loyalty
training as a means of mitigation, we see a noticeable increase of the infected population
from 1 to about 40 million people, after about 100 days. Around the 150 days the infected
population decreases and stables at zero. The susceptible population decreases while the
recovered population increases at the same rate as the susceptible population. Both popula-
tions become stable within a year with the susceptible population well below the recovered
population for the rest of the time.
At 40% and 50% completion, the infected population increases less significantly, decreases
and stabilizes at zero around the 200 days mark. The susceptible and recovered populations
followed the same course as described in 20% completion. This time, less people were
infected and the gap between susceptible and recovered is narrower.
After 60% completion, about 5 million people were infected after a year, and that popula-
tion decreases to zero. We observe a net separation between the recovered and susceptible
populations with recovered population greater than the susceptible at all times.
At 90% and 100%, the infected population does not show any movement. The susceptible
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population remains constant at 17 million after 90% completion and zero at 100%. The
recovered population approaches the total population in both cases.
We can therefore infer that implementing loyalty as a prevention measure helped mitigate




In this paper, we discussed the relationships between insider threat and loyalty using two
major models, linear regression models and differential equations models. In the linear
regression models, we used three different means to generate data to explore the effects of
loyalty on insider threat. In the differential equations models, we used two epidemiology
Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) models for infectious disease dynamics to analyse
the interactions between the two variables.
We observed in the linear regression models that the regression lines have negative slopes,
the coefficient of correlation A of each data is negative with the |A | ≥ 0.6, and the p-value of
each model \ ≤ 2.5%. These results are evidence of a strong relationship between insider
threat and loyalty. When loyalty increases, insider threat decreases. We conclude that an
individual’s plausibility of posing insider threat may depend on his loyalty. This inference
is validated by the p-values. However, we do not have any evidence that disloyalty causes
insider threat.
The SIR models show that when we allow the system to run its course without implemen-
tation of loyalty as mitigating measure, the non-insider population (susceptible) decreases
due to infection. After a period of time, it increases but to a level much lower than the level
of the initial condition, and becomes constant. At the same time, the recovered population
increases for the same period of time, decreases a bit and becomes stable. However, the
level of the susceptible population remains greater than that of the recovered population.
The self-regulation approach did not solve the problems of danger insider threats pose.
The simulation with loyalty as mitigating measure shows significant improvement. After
20% of the labor force complete the loyalty training, the non-insider population decreases
and becomes stable, while The recovered population increases and become stable well above
the susceptible population. There is clear distinction between susceptible and recovered
populations after 60% of the employed population is exposed to loyalty, and the recovered
population remains well above the susceptible population the whole thereafter. The situation
gets notably better at 90% and 100% completion. We conclude that loyalty may be a great
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mitigating factor against insider threat 4.10.
We assumed in our simulations an interaction between only two factors, loyalty and insider
threat. However, there are other factors that may interfere. Loyalty as a behavior may not
be quantifiable and may be influenced by other social circumstances. Subjecting insider
threat to just the effect of loyalty while ignoring other factors and behaviors that occur in
the workplace may limit the reach of our conclusions. There have to be other intrinsic and
extrinsic reasons or motivations for a person to become an insider that we did not consider
in this research that may be worth analyzing.
We made many assumptions in the SIR models that may have affected our results and
consequently our conclusion, andwe did not usemore advancemethods such neural network
that would have produced better results.
The methods we used to generate our data, although scientific may not reflect reality.
Assigning scores to behavioral indicators based on analytical interpretation of definitions
and isolated case studies may infer that all cases are the same and individual situation are
identical without knowledge of people’s background and experiences that may have well
shaped their actions. Rather than quantifying one’s behavior, future studies should consider
individual’s sensitivity to the behavioral indicators.
Additional research should be conducted to further explore the impact of loyalty on insider
threat in the presence of other factors’ influence. A survey or other means should be
used to collect real data on insider threat, loyalty, and other variables that may interact in
the workplace. After more data collected, more advance data analysis techniques such as
machine learning should be used in future studies to test and improve our results.
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